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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CITY OF ST. GEORGE,

]

Plaintiff/Respondent, ]
vs.

i

Case No. 890636-CA

ELZA E. MILLER,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal

in this

matter pursuant to U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 78--2a-3 (2) (c) Replacement
Volume 9, 1987 Ed., and Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals.

1

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Appeal followed a jury verdict in Washington County Fifth
Circuit Court, Criminal Case No. 891000968, finding Appellant
guilty

of

violating

Sec.

1102(a), Uniform

Plumbing

adopted by St. George, a Class B misdemeanor.

Code as

An Affidavit of

Bias and Prejudice filed by Defendant on July 12, 1989, was
certified

to

sufficiency,

Judge
and

Dean

on

July

E.

Conder

19,

for

1989,

insufficient grounds for disqualification.
a jury on October 3, 1989;
Verdict

at

the

close

of

a

ruling

Judge

Conder

on

the
found

The case was tried to

Appellant's Motion for a Directed
the Respondent's

case was denied;

Appellant's Motion for Judgment n.o.v. was denied;

sentencing

imposed a fine of $750.00, $500.00 of which was suspended for a
period of one year on condition that the obstruction be removed
from the Hopkins' water line where it traverses property of the
Appellant.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether the Appellant charged with willfully placing a stone
in the portion of a neighbor's
traverses

(Hopkins) sewer lateral that

a portion of his backyard received

Specifically, the questions raised are:
(1) Whether the evidence was sufficient:

2

a

fair trial.

(a)

to show that a thing was placed into a private or
public sewer that could cause damage thereto;

(b)

and

to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Appellant was the person responsible for such
object being placed in the sewer.

(2)

Whether the Court properly excluded evidence of the

prior relationship between Appellant and a tenant on the Hopkins'
property.
(3)

Whether the trial judge committed error in not recusing

himself from the matter.

3

STATUTORY PROVISIONS CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE
The Uniform Plumbing Code as adopted by the City of St.
George stating:
(a)

It shall be unlawful for any person to deposit, by any
means whatsoever, into any plumbing fixture, floor
drain, interceptor, sump, receptacle or device which is
connected to any drainage system, public sewer, private
sewer, septic tank or cesspool any ashes, cinders,
solids, rags, flammable, poisonous or explosive liquids
or gases, oils, grease and any other thing whatsoever
which would, or could cause damage to the public sewer,
private sewer or private sewage disposal system.

Rule 29 of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 77-35-29, U.C.A.
stating:
(c)

If the prosecution or a defendant in any criminal
action or proceedings shall file an affidavit that
the judge before whom such action or proceeding is
to be tried or heard has a bias or prejudice,
either against such party or his attorney or in
favor of any opposing party to the suit, such
judge shall proceed no further therein until the
challenge is disposed of. Every such affidavit
shall state the facts and the reasons for the
belief that such bias or prejudice exists and
shall be filed as soon as practicable after the
case has been assigned or such bias or prejudice
is known. No such affidavit shall be filed unless
accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record
that such affidavit and application are made in
good faith.

(d)

If the challenged judge questions the sufficiency
of the allegation of disqualification, he shall
enter an order directing that a copy thereof be
forthwith certified to another named judge of the
same court or of a court of like jurisdiction,
which judge shall then pass upon the legal
sufficiency of the allegations. If the challenged

4

judge does not question the legal sufficiency of
the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the
affidavit is certified finds that it is legally
sufficient, another judge shall be called to try
the case or to conduct the proceeding. If the
judge to whom the affidavit is certified does not
find the affidavit to be legally sufficient, he
shall enter a finding to that effect and the
challenged judge shall proceed with the case or
proceeding.

STATEMENT
Apart from an expected lack of objectivity, the Appellant's
statement of the case is sufficiently accurate that restatement
will only serve to correct details that are less than material.
The addition, of the following facts from the trial, although
minimized

by

Appellant,

are

considered

by

Respondent

to be

material.
1.

Appellant has been a master plumber for about 20 years

and been working at the profession of plumbing for almost 35
years

(Trans, p.85, 1.3-8).
2.

yard

A block wall divides Appellant's yard from the Hopkins'

(Trans., p.113, 1.22).

There was no evidence that the

clean-out located on Hopkins' line but on Appellant's side of
that wall was accessible to anyone but Appellant.

There is

evidence from which a conclusion can be reached that the City
employees who discovered the rock were unable to access the yard
5

through the fence and may not in fact have ever seen into
Appellant's backyard (Trans,, p.42, 1.12-20)•
3.

The object found to be blocking the line was readily

identifiable by both witnesses who observed it, and there was no
question in their mind as to what it was (Trans., p.51, p.62).
The rock was located "right below" or "just past" the clean-out
on Appellant's side of the fence (Trans., p. 54, 1.25;
1.8).

p. 63,

The two witnesses described the rock as almost the same

diameter as the inside of the pipe (Trans., p. 51, 1.11;

p. 62,

1.22), and one of the witnesses found it to be wedged when he
attempted to push it with the camera rod (Trans., p. 51, 1.1416) .

They found it very unlikely that the rock could have

traveled down the line from the other clean-out over on the
Hopkins' property (Trans., p. 65, 1. 17-21).
4.

The City employees did not make a video tape of their

findings in the sewer line because they did not bring with them a
TV van with capability for video tapes, indicating that there
would have been a problem getting such van into the Hopkins'
backyard (Trans., p. 46, 1.16-19).
5.
was

In September, 1989, some four months after the blockage

noted, the rock

apparently was no longer

in the line.

Appellant called a witness who observed him running a garden hose
down the Hopkins sewer line from the clean-out on his property
6

"until

he

ran

out

of

garden

hose"

(Trans,,

p.73,

1.14).

Appellant dug up the Hopkins7 sewer line on his property and
alleges he found a point of constriction where waste material
could get hung up;

he described that as occurring at a point at

about eight feet downstream from the clean-out (Trans., p. 101,
1.12) .
6.

There was a showing of animosity between Appellant and

Mr. and Mrs,. Hopkins, not only in the frequent threats to block
the sewer line, but through the context in which the statements
were made (Trans., p.137, 1.16-17).

ARGUMENT:

SUMMARY

First, there was ample evidence upon which the jury could
find that

(1) the portion of the Hopkins7 sewer line on the

Appellant's property was not readily accessible to anyone but the
Appellant, unless it were through the sewer line itself;

(2)

because of his knowledge and accessibility, Appellant had the
capability to obstruct the sewer line;

(3)

the sewer was

blocked by a rock appeared to have been inserted through the
clean-out

on Appellant's property;

and

(4) the Appellant's

animosity toward Hopkins, as evidenced by threats to block the
sewer, provided the Appellant with adequate motivation.

7

Second, it was not necessary to Appellant's case for him to
present negative evidence that there was no animosity between him
and Hopkins' tenant, or between him and any other neighbor, when
animosity

toward

Hopkins

himself

was

before

the

court

and

sufficient to show motivation.
Third, the role of the trial judge in prior

litigation

involving Appellant, and his remarks with regard thereto, did not
show

bias

or

prejudice

on

his

part,

and

his

refusal

to

voluntarily disqualify himself was not material error.

ARGUMENT:
1.

ELABORATION

Sufficiency of the Evidence.

Appellant argues that (1)

there was no evidence on the issue of whether material deposited
in the sewer could cause damage, and

(2) the circumstantial

evidence linking Appellant to the blockage was not substantial
enough to support the verdict.
(a)

The ordinance makes it clear that any material or

"thing" placed

in a public sewer or in any private lateral

feeding into a public sewer that has a potential for harming or
disrupting

the

sewer

liability.

Issue was made as to whether a rock constitutes such

material or thing;

system

can be the basis

for criminal

the evidence that it did in fact block the

sewer line is sufficient evidence in itself of the deleterious
8

nature of the item.

The rock was of a size to plug the sewer

line entirely (Trans., p.55, 1.7-9) and it was of a rough texture
(Trans., p.53, 1.25).

The potential of such a rock for damage or

obstruction to a sewer line so as to be harmful is apparent
without the introduction of further evidence.
(b)

The evidence is circumstantial, at least as to the

Appellant's involvement, but circumstances were shown from which
the jury could easily infer the Appellant's guilt.

It was the

best evidence which the nature of the case admitted under the
circumstances present, and it led to a reasonable inference, not
a mere suspicion of the Appellant's actions in connection with
the obstruction.

The jury was allowed to consider a reasonable

alternative hypothesis which it rejected.

Evidence showing the

Appellant's ability and motivation was found to be relevant and
admitted in evidence.

The inference drawn by the jury from the

evidence presented to it should not be disturbed upon appeal
unless

found

to

be

clearly

erroneous.

The

case

cited

by

Appellant, In the Matter of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989) not
only requires the Appellant to "marshal all the evidence" but to
then demonstrate that despite this evidence the jury verdict is
"so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of
evidence, thus making (it) clearly erroneous", citing State v.
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-93 (Utah 1987).
with the verdict in this matter;

That was not the case

the evidence was sufficient to

support the verdict.
9

2.

Refusal

of Evidence Regarding

Appellant and Others,

Relationship

Between

Appellant argues that testimony of the

relationship between he and Hopkins' tenant (Ed) was relevant
under Utah Rules of Evidence 401 and 402, and that the Court's
refusal

to allow

its presentation denied him the

present a defense".

"right to

In doing so, Appellant confuses testimony

that shows the absence of a motive with testimony that merely
narrows the bases for a motive.

The Appellant attempted "to

demonstrate that there was no animosity between Mr. Miller and
this

fellow

named

Ed"

(Trans., p.85, 1.20-22).

The Court

properly ruled that negative evidence with regard to all of the
circumstances that might have given rise to a motive but did not
was not relevant.

Respondent had presented no evidence to show

that Appellant would block the sewer line if Respondent sold the
property to someone of whom he didn't approve;

rather, the

Respondent's evidence showed that Appellant's animosity extended
to a sale to anyone.

Rule of Evidence 403 allows a court to

exclude

its

evidence

if

probative

value

is

substantially

outweighed by the danger that time will be wasted, and the trial
court's action is clearly sustainable on that basis.
3.

The Trial Court Committed No Error by Not Recusing

Itself Because of the Allegation of Bias and Prejudice.

Neither

the trial court nor the judge to which the issue was referred to
pass upon Appellant's allegations of bias and prejudice felt that

10

the allegations of disqualification were sufficient.

Appellant

now seems to argue that the mere filing of an affidavit alleging
bias

and

prejudice

creates

sufficient

unfairness so as to mandate recusal.

aura

of

perceived

He relies primarily upon

sentiments expressed by Justice Wade in a concurring opinion in
Haslam v. Morrison, 190 P.2d 520 (Utah 1948).
not the applicable

That position is

law, and unless there was in fact bias or

prejudice so as to disqualify the judge, no error was committed.
The standard inquiry required by the cases dealing with the
question
would

of bias or prejudice is "whether a reasonable person

have

a

impartiality."

reasonable
In

re

basis

Beard,

for

811

questioning

F.2d

818

the

(1st

Cir.

judge's
1987);

United States v. Hines, 696 F.2d 722, 728 (10th Cir. 1982).

The

Utah statute commits a decision to recuse to the sound discretion
of

the

trial

judge

and

the

reviewing

Circuit

Court

judge.

Reversal by this court should only occur in the event of an abuse
of that discretion.
1984);

Varela v. Jones, 746 F.2d 1413

(10th Cir.

United States v. Page, 828 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1987).

An affidavit of bias and prejudice is strictly construed against
the affiant, and there is a substantial burden on the moving
party to demonstrate the judge is not impartial.

United States

v. Hall, 121 F.Supp. 508, 534, aff'd, 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir.),
cert, denied, 429 U.S. 919, 97 S.Ct. 313, 50 L.Ed.2d 285 (1976).
See also United States v. Hines, supra.
that burden.
11

Appellant has not met

There is as much obligation for a judge not to recuse when there
is no occasion for him to do so as there is for him to do so when
there is such occasion.
College, 664 F.2d

Brody v. President & Fellows of Harvard

10, 12

S.Ct. 1731, 72 L.Ed.2d

(1st Cir. 1981), 455 U.S. 1027, 102

148 (1982);

United States v. Haldeman.

559 F.2d 31, 139 n. 360 (D.C. Cir. 1976), 431 U.S. 933, 97 S.Ct.
2641,

53 L.Ed.2d

250

(1977);

851, 857 (10th Cir. 1976);
Inc. , 634

F.Supp.

1110,

United States v. Brav, 546 F.2d

Danielson v. Winnfield Funeral Home,
1116

(E.D.

La.

1986);

Dulanev

Winnfield Funeral Home, 820 F.2d 1222 (5th Cir. 1987);
H. Robins, Co. , 602 F.Supp. 243, 245

(D. Kan. 1985).

v.

In re A.
A judge

should not recuse himself on unsupported, irrational, or highly
tenuous speculation.
1558

United States v. Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556,

(11th Cir. 1986);

Davis v. Commissioner, 734 F.2d 1302,

1303 (8th Cir. 1984) (affidavits based on conclusions, opinions,
and rumors are insufficient for recusal);

In re United States,

666 F.2d 690, 695 (1st Cir. 1981) (though public confidence may
be as shaken by published inferences ofr bias that are false as by
those which

are true, judge considering

disqualification

must

ignore rumors, innuendos, and erroneous information).
The only specific instance given in support of the effort to
disqualify the trial judge is the Order of July 18, 1989, p. 9 of
the

Respondent's

Addendum,

which

refers

to

a

previous

case

involving the same parties (but different facts) where the same
12

judge had previously presided•

Yet the cases hold that what a

judge learns or comes to believe in his judicial capacity "is a
proper basis for judicial observations, and the use of such
information

is

not

disqualification,"

the

kind

of

matter

that

results

in

United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775, 785

(2d Cir.)/ cert, denied, 429 US 998, 97 S.Ct. 523, 50 L.Ed.2d 608
(1976) .

The comments do not indicate that the judge formed an

opinion on the basis of his involvement in the prior case that in
any way predisposed him so as to create a bias or prejudice.
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 US 563, 583, 86 S.Ct. 1698,
16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966).

A determination of bias under the Rule

applicable here must be based

on extrajudicial

conduct arising in a trial setting.

conduct, not

Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.

v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 861 F.2d 1307 (1st Cir.
1989) .
While clearly not a ground under the Utah Rule, the judge's
relationship to attorney for the Respondent is raised as a factor
to be considered.

The cases hold that bias against a lawyer,

even if found to exist, is not bias against his client unless it
is so "virulent" as to spill over against the client.
Jacobs, 855 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1988);

U.S. v.

Drexel Burnham Lambert,

Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra.

By the same

reasoning, bias for an attorney, even if it were presumed to
exist

because

of

the

relationship,
13

cannot

automatically

be

presumed to be bias against the Respondent or the basis for
disqualification.

CONCLUSION
Respondent challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, but
he

fails to bear the burden of showing that there was not

competent evidence to support the verdict of the jury.

The

Supreme Court,s discussion of the degree of proof necessary to
support a jury verdict in Utah State Road Commission v. Steele
Ranch, 533 P. 2d 888 at 890 (Utah 1975) is still applicable and
provides the criteria by which the sufficiency of the evidence
should be examined.

The evidence here is not inconsequential.

The court did not deprive Appellant of a defense by refusing to
allow him

to

show the relationship between himself

and the

neighbor's tenant when that testimony was not relevant in light
of the motive relied upon by Respondent.

Further, the trial

judge committed no error in refusing to disqualify himself as
there was

in

fact no showing of bias and prejudice toward

Respondent on the part of that judge.

There is no error in the

proceedings below that would mandate a reversal by this court.
DATED this 26th day qf\ftarch, 19^0.

T/~W. SHUMWAY
\
Attorney for City of St. George
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